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Abstract
This essay examines the capital accounting of Kovacik v.
Reed, leading authority addressing allocation of losses
between a partner who contributed only property and another
who contributed only services. Kovacik posits that such
parties having agreed to share profits equally have implicitly
agreed their contributions were of equal value. This essay
shows that such an agreement would not produce the result
Kovacik reaches. The Kovacik result is instead produced by
the following implausible implicit agreement between the
parties: The value of the services provided by the services
partner to be treated as a capital contribution equals the
amount the partnership loses on a cash basis. The more the
firm ultimately loses, the more those services are agreed to be
worth.
Prior work by Bainbridge identifies a manifestation of a
problem in this context referenced as overinvestment in the
financial economics literature. This essay further
demonstrates the Kovacik result can create a complementary
underinvestment problem.
INTRODUCTION
Kovacik v. Reed1 is a staple of the study of partnership law.2 It is
leading authority addressing allocation of losses between a partner who
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contributed only property and another who contributed only services where
the partners' express agreement allocated profits equally. The case holds
that in liquidation, losses aggregating less than the property contributed are
entirely allocated to the partner who contributed property.3 The services
partner is not required to make a contribution to share the losses, nor does
the services partner receive property in the liquidation. As justification, the
Kovacik opinion posits that "the parties have, by their agreement to share
equally in profits, agreed that the value of their contributions-the money
on the one hand and the labor on the other-were likewise equal.
'A
Students of the law of business organizations frequently prefer to elide
issues of accounting. Perhaps that is a preference for judges as well. The
opinion in Kovacik does not actually try to reproduce the parties' capital
accounts. The case illustrates why, for judges as well as other students of
the law, a focus on accounting details can be crucial: Reducing to
accounting numbers the court's verbal formulation of an abstract test yields
two incontrovertible observations:
1. The opinion, although purporting to rationalize its
outcome in two different ways, in fact-apparently
without the knowledge of the opinion's author-
articulates principles that support two different rules.
2. Delving into the capital accounting shows that the
outcome is consistent with a hypothetical ex ante bargain
that is patently implausible.
This essay serves two purposes. It provides insight into the doctrinal
issue addressed by Kovacik-allocation of partnership property on winding-
up when the partnership lost money and one partner's capital contribution
solely comprised services. It also illustrates the importance focusing on
numbers can have in understanding case-law construing accounting issues,
because that is necessary to illuminate the peculiarity of the Kovacik
opinion.
The remainder of this essay develops the following conclusions: the
Kovacik opinion at one point posits that "the parties have, by their
agreement to share equally in profits, agreed that the value of their
contributions ... were likewise equal."5 Part I of this essay shows that such
an agreement as to the value of the contributions does not produce the result
Kovacik reaches. That Part further shows the Kovacik result is instead
produced by the following implicit agreement between the parties: The
value of the services provided by the services partner to be treated as a
capital contribution equals the amount the partnership loses on a cash basis.
The more the firm ultimately loses, the more those services are agreed to be
worth. There is not a plausible basis for concluding the parties would have
3 Kovacik, 315 P.2d at 316.
41d.
51Id.
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believed that was the value of the services to be provided by the services
partner.
As noted in Part I, Bainbridge has stated it is difficult to ascertain the
majoritarian hypothetical bargain-the bargain that a majority of partners
would have reached had they expressly negotiated as to the matter. One
reason he identifies is that the Kovacik result can create incentives for a
services-only partner to cause the partnership to engage in excessive risk-
taking (similar to the overinvestment phenomenon familiar from financial
economics).6
This essay, while not disagreeing with that conclusion, demonstrates in
Part II that the opposite incentive also may be created. The Kovacik result
also may create incentives for a services-only partner to wish the
partnership to be more risk-averse than one seeking to maximize the
aggregate return to the firm. This further supports Bainbridge's conclusion
that the hypothetical bargain in this circumstance is indeterminate.
That Part also identifies another factor complicating identification of
the majoritarinan hypothetical bargain. Capital accounting focuses the
question on what value should be ascribed to a partner's contribution of
services. To frame the hypothetical bargain in terms of that value,
reflecting the way capital accounting presents the issue, can substantially
alter the conclusion relative to framing the inquiry in terms of how a
majority of partners would have wanted to resolve the ultimate issue-
allocation of the property in liquidation.
Lastly, Part III demonstrates that the problems with the internal
inconsistency in Kovacik are not confined to circumstances where the
property-contributing partner agrees to contribute a fixed amount of
property. That Part demonstrates a similar result can obtain where that
partner agrees to fund cash-flow needs up to a specified amount.
I. ANALYSIS OF KOVACIK V. REED
A. The Outcome in Kovacik; An Introduction to the Capital
Accounting
The pertinent facts and holding of Kovacik v. Reed can be easily
summarized. Kovacik and Reed formed a partnership to do kitchen
remodeling. Reed would provide only services--estimating jobs and
overseeing the work.7 Kovacik would contribute only cash, 8 agreeing to
provide $10,000. 9 The parties agreed to split profits equally, without
6 See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
7 Kovacik, 315 P.2d at 315.8 Id.
9 Id. at 316. This essay discusses in Part III, infra, the alternative possibility that
Kovacik made a promise to contribute cash to the extent required to meet the
partnership's cash-flow obligations, up to $10,000.
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discussing possible losses.' 0 Section 18(a) of the Uniform Partnership Act,
which was in effect in California at the time, provides, as a default, that
losses follow profits."
The partnership ultimately dissolved after having realized a loss of
$8,680.12 Kovacik received a judgment against Reed for half this amount, 3
which the California Supreme Court reversed, 4 noting, "Where ... one
partner ... contributes the money capital as against the other's skill and
labor, all the cases cited, and which our research has discovered, hold that
neither party is liable to the other for contribution for any loss sustained."' 5
The brief opinion does not detail the timing and amounts of the
partnership's cash flows; only the ultimate conclusion-the amount of the
loss-is provided. The opinion's recitation of the facts notes only obliquely
a crucial element-that Kovacik agreed to invest $10,000.16 Nevertheless,
the information provided is sufficient to construct the essentials of the
capital accounting.
Sections 18(a) and 40 of the U.P.A. provide the statutory language that
capital accounting tracks. The partners' capital accounts, which implement
the express provisions of the U.P.A., as of the time the partnership is
formed, can be depicted as followsl7:




The explanation is as follows: we do not know precisely the timing of
Kovacik's contribution of cash to the partnership. For ease of exposition,
the case will first be analyzed construing Kovacik's undertaking as
involving an agreement to contribute $10,000. For our purposes, the timing
of the cash contributions is not important, just the total amount that he
contributed (or, if he did not contribute all he agreed to contribute, the
amount he agreed to contribute). As noted above, the opinion is somewhat
ambiguous in describing the contribution obligation.' 8 As noted in Part III,
l°Id. at 315.
11 Section 18 of the U.P.A. was codified in California at that time at Cal. Corporations
Code § 15018 (West 1955), repealed, 1996 Cal. Stat. 5905.
12 See Kovacik, 315 P.2d at 315.
13 id
14 Id. at 317.
5 1d. at 316.
16 See id. at 316 ("[P]laintiff here lost only some $8,680-or somewhat less than the
$10,000 which he originally proposed and agreed to invest.").
17 Sections 18 and 40 of the U.P.A. were codified in California at that time at Cal.
Corporations Code §§ 15018, 15040 (West 1955), repealed, 1996 Cal. Stat. 5905.
I8 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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infra, a similar analysis applies-and the result the Kovacik court reaches
is, in general, internally inconsistent-where Kovacik's obligation is one to
meet the firm's cash-flow obligations, up to $10,000. So, for ease of
exposition, this essay assumes in this Part that Kovacik agreed to make a
specified contribution of $10,000.
As to Reed, his agreement to provide services does not result in an
accretion his capital account. That is because section 18(a) of the U.P.A.,
which somewhat indirectly sets forth the principles governing capital
accounting, indicates that, on dissolution each partner is, in addition to
receiving his share of profits or losses, "repaid his contributions, whether
by way of capital or advances to the partnership property." 19 Reed's capital
account is not increased by a promise to provide services because the
provision of a service is not an advancement of property.
So, we can show the firm having capital accounts equal to its total
assets, Kovacik's contribution of (or obligation to contribute) $10,000. The
sum of the partners' individual capital accounts equals the firm's net worth.
For purposes of capital accounting-to implement section 18 of the
U.P.A.-each partner's capital account is increased by (w) his share of
profits and (x) his capital contributions and decreased by (y) his
withdrawals from the partnership and (z) his share of partnership losses.2 °
We do not know the timing of the expenditures and revenues of the
partnership. But, fortunately, preparation of the final capital accounts does
not require us to know that. We know the partnership ultimately lost
$8,680. Thus, at the end of the partnership's operations, it now has net
assets of $1,320 (its net assets when it began business, $10,000, minus its
losses, or $10,000 - $8,680).
19 See, e.g., Cal. Corporations Code § 15018(a) (West 1955), repealed, 1996 Cal. Stat.
5905.
20 Capital accounting in the R.U.P.A. is based on the following provision:
(a) Each partner is deemed to have an account that is:
(1) credited with an amount equal to the money plus the value of any
other property, net of the amount of any liabilities, the partner
contributes to the partnership and the partner's share of the partnership
profits; and
(2) charged with an amount equal to the money plus the value of any
other property, net of the amount of any liabilities, distributed by the
partnership to the partner and the partner's share of the partnership
losses.
R.U.P.A. § 401 (Westlaw through 2004). As a textual matter, the U.P.A. does not, as
the R.U.P.A. does, formally define a capital account in this way. See J. DENNIS HYNES
& MARK J. LOEWENSTEIN, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP AND THE LLC: THE LAW OF
UNINCORPORATED BUSINESs ENTERPRISES 638 (7"h ed. 2007). However, as the
comments to this section note, "Section 401 is drawn substantially from U.P.A. Section
18," R.U.P.A. § 401, cmt. 1, and the two Acts would provide for the same additions to
and deductions from a capital account.
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The U.P.A. provides that, unless the parties agreed otherwise, losses
are shared equally. 2' There was not such an agreement. So, each partner's
capital account will be decreased by one-half the losses, or $4,340. That
reduces Kovacik's capital account to $5,660 ($10,000- $4,340), and Reed's
capital account to -$4,340 ($0 - $4,340). Thus, when the business is to be
wound-up, the parties' capital accounts look like this:




The firm's assets are $1,320 at the time. Now, we don't know whether
Kovacik actually contributed all the $10,000 he promised to contribute.
Let's say he only contributed $9,000. For our purposes, it is sufficient to
say that would mean the partnership has assets of $320 on-hand, plus the
right to an additional $1,000 contribution from Kovacik. As a formal
matter, the right to receive the additional $1,000 might not be treated as an
asset for capital accounting purposes, which would cause a corresponding
decrease in Kovacik's capital account of $1,000.22 The choice of that
treatment or the treatment reflected in Figure 2 does not account for the
discrepancy in the capital accounting treatment and the actual result in
Kovacik. For ease of exposition, the single treatment referenced in Figure 2
is discussed here.
To wind up the partnership in accordance with the rules provided by
U.PA. § 18(a), each partner having a positive value in his capital account
should receive property of that total value, and each partner having a
negative balance in his capital account needs to contribute that amount to
the partnership. So, the capital accounting called-for by the U.P.A.
provides that Reed needs to contribute $4,340. The intermediate appellate
court provided the answer the literal terms of the U.P.A. provide.2 3 The
California Supreme Court did not.
24
Before turning to why the language of the California Supreme Court's
opinion is inconsistent, we need to recognize one inherent aspect of the
capital accounting. At the time property is to be distributed, the sum of the
21 See, e.g., Cal. Corporations Code § 15018(a) (West 1955), repealed, 1996 Cal. Stat.
5905.
22 In that case, once the $1,000 was contributed, the contribution would increase
Kovacik's capital account. In the treatment reflected in Figure 2, the delivery of $1,000
would not change the capital account; it would merely represent payment of a debt
owing the partnership.
23 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
24 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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parties' capital accounts has to equal the firm's net assets to be distributed.
It is tautological. Recognition of this tautology is part of illuminating why
the California Supreme Court's opinion is internally inconsistent.
B. Services as Property; the Valuation Necessary to Support the
Kovacik Result
The California Supreme Court, in justifying its outcome, articulates the
following view:
[T]he parties have, by their agreement to share equally in profits,
agreed that the value of their contributions-the money on the
one hand and the labor on the other-were likewise equal; it
would follow that upon the loss, as here, of both money and labor,
the parties have shared equally in the losses. Actually, of course,
plaintiff here lost only some $8,680--or somewhat less than the
$10,000 he originally proposed and agreed to invest.2 5
Although California adopted the U.P.A. in 1929, the California
Supreme Court's opinion is unhinged from the statutory language. The
opinion does not expressly go through the steps of showing how statutory
provisions would treat such an agreement.26 Framing the court's discussion
in terms of the statutory language therefore requires making some
inferences.
Section 18 of the U.P.A., in its introductory language, indicates that
the distribution rules of section 18(a) can be changed by agreement among
21the parties. So, the provision that contributions of services do not result in
accretions to a partner's capital account can be changed by agreement. It
appears that the opinion, by this quoted language, concludes that the parties
are implicitly agreeing in this context that the contribution of services will
be treated as a capital contribution for capital accounting purposes.
However, the court's failure to detail the application of this broad standard
to the actual statutory provisions obscures problems with the view the court
expresses. The problem becomes clear by looking at the capital accounts
on formation and at winding-up.
If there were such an agreement that Reed's services were to be
considered contributions to capital and that he had agreed to provide
services valued equally with the property Kovacik contributed, the parties'
25 Kovacik, 315 P.2d at 316.
26 1929 Cal. Stat. 1896. Sections 18 and 40 of the U.P.A. were codified in California at
that time at Cal. Corporations Code §§ 15018, 15040 (West 1955), repealed, 1996 Cal.
Stat. 5905.
27 See, e.g., Cal. Corporations Code § 15018 (West 1955), repealed, 1996 Cal. Stat.
5905.
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capital accounts at the time the partnership was formed would have been as
follows:




Above it was noted that the sum of the parties' capital accounts must
equal the net assets to be distributed. This is where that understanding
comes into play. For capital accounting purposes, if we say that services
are counted as contributions, the partnership's losses during business for
capital accounting purposes are increased, relative to the losses that were
understood to have arisen when the firm did not treat the services as capital
contributions.
We know that the firm ends up with $1,320 in cash, after having
received $10,000 in cash capital contribution. The capital accounting
cannot change that. However, for purposes of capital accounting, if it ends
up with $1,320 in net assets and has had initial contributions of $20,000,
that means, for capital accounting purposes, the firm has lost $18,680
($20,000 - $1,320). In order to have a value of $1,320 when it is wound-up,
it has "spent" both the $10,000 initial capital contribution as well as the
$10,000 of Reed's services. Thus, the capital accounting when the
partnership is wound-up looks like the following:
Figure 4: Final Capital Accounts if Reed's Services Valued Equally
Kovacik
property contribution $10,000




share of loss ($9,340)
Total $660
Total $1,320
Treating Reed's services as a capital contribution, for purposes of
section 18(a) of the U.P.A., valued at $10,000 would require that, on
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dissolution, Reed would get $660 from the partnership.28 To be clear, not
only would Reed owe nothing, but he would, in fact, get something back.
One might wonder what value must be ascribed to Reed's promise to
provide services in order to have Reed owe nothing and get back nothing.
The answer is $8,680. It is not a coincidence-a product of a fortuitous
choice of numbers in this case-that this is the amount that the partnership
lost on a cash (actual) basis. We would get a comparable result with
different numbers. The detail of the analysis follows.
If Reed's services are valued at $8,680, the firm's initial contributions
are valued at $18,680. The firm has net assets of $1,320 on liquidation. So,
the firm has a loss, for capital account purposes, of $17,360 ($18,680 -
$1,320), or $8,680 each. The computations comparable to those in Figure 4
are:
Figure 5: Final Capital Accounts if Reed's Services Valued at the
Amount of the Cash Loss Actually Incurred
Kovacik
property contribution $10,000




share of loss ($8,680)
Total $0
Total $1,320
C. The Inconsistency of the Kovacik Opinion; Indeterminacy of the
Majoritarian Hypothetial Bargain
The introduction states the opinion is internally inconsistent. Now we
can see why. At one point it references the parties as having silently agreed
that the contributions to capital provided by each is of the same amount.
29
Figure 4 shows that if that were the agreement the parties had entered into,
Reed would be owed $660-which is not the result the court reaches.
This analysis also provides an argument for rejecting the Kovacik
result that is not apparent unless one has gone through the arithmetic of the
capital accounts. It is common to fill-in gaps in contractual obligations by
28 Bainbridge notes, "Some students argue that the U.P.A. results in a windfall by the
capital partner." Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 655. He does not detail the theory
underlying these concerns.
29 See supra text accompanying note 25
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trying to figure out what parties would have agreed-upon had the matter
been expressly discussed.3 ° One might make the following argument:
A court should ascertain what the majoritarian hypothetical
bargain is. One can easily imagine the parties, at the time the
contract was formed, having agreed that the value of Reed's
promise to provide services was equivalent to Kovacik's promise
to provide cash. Otherwise, why would the parties have split
profits equally? If that's what the parties are considered to have
agreed-to, and to have Reed's contribution of services be treated
as a contribution to capital, Reed is owed $660.
One cannot, on the other hand envision parties having, at the
time the partnership was formed, agreed that Reed's agreement to
provide services should be valued at the amount of the cash loss
that the partnership will sustain over the course of its operation.
That's the value that needs to be set if Reed owes nothing and
Kovacik keeps all the remaining property. But there is not a good
reason why the parties would have agreed to that valuation. It is
not related to anything one can envision the parties thinking about
when the partnership was formed.
There is an important level of generality in the hypothetical bargain
that may be overlooked. The discussion in this essay frames the question as
the hypothetical bargain between the parties concerning the relative values
of their capital contribution. It does that because the statutory provisions
cause the issue to be framed in that way. The U.P.A. provides for a
repayment of capital contributions in liquidation. It is by deeming services
a contribution to capital that one can harmonize the Kovacik result with the
statute. So, the U.P.A. focuses the analysis on how to fit the contribution of
services within that framework.
There is, of course, another way to look at the issue-what the parties
would have bargained-for as to the ultimate result in this context. The level
of generality at which one asks the question can matter substantially.
Bainbridge provides a lengthy discussion of the majoritarian
hypothetical bargain of parties in this context. He identifies as the most
likely candidates:
" All capital losses were to be bome by the capital partner
alone (Kovacik).
* Sharing of capital losses in accordance with sharing of
profits (statute).
30 See, e.g., Taylor v. Caldwell, (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309, 312 (K.B.) (stating, in
discussing the impact of the destruction of a music hall on contract calling for making it
available for use, "There seems little doubt that this implication tends to further the
great object of making the legal construction such as to fulfill the intention of those who
entered into the contract. For in the course of affairs men in making such contracts in
general would, if it were brought to their minds, say that there should be such a
condition.").
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* If the service-only partner has made a nominal capital
contribution, allocate capital losses according to the ratio
of capital contributions.3 '
As Bainbridge notes, because the partner providing services most
likely has less capital than the other partner, it might seem natural to
allocate the risk of a loss to the party who is better able to bear the loss-
the party who has capital.32 The result in Kovacik is consistent. Yet, Sher
and Bromberg noted fifty years ago an economic factor that undercuts the
power of the rationale of the Kovacik rule to predict the majoritarian
hypothetical bargain: "The reasoning is specious if value is gauged by
future earning power: that of [the property-contributing partner's] asset is
lost with the asset, that of the [services partner's] labor continues as a
personal capacity. 33
Bainbridge additionally provides a thoughtful observation that would
militate against the Kovacik result being the majoritarian hypothetical
bargain. He notes the Kovacik approach creates incentives for the services
partner, who by postulate will be the partner more involved in the day-to-
day operations, to cause the firm to engage in excessive risk-taking.34 One
might view the point as an extreme application of the overinvestment
problem identified in Jensen and Meckling's seminal work.35 In light of the
competing factors, Bainbridge ultimately concludes, "In sum, there does not
appear to be a determinate majoritarian outcome to the hypothetical bargain
in this context."
36
This case illustrates an inherent difficulty in seeking to apply the
hypothetical bargain standard-the level of generality to be used is not
obvious. 37  Would one use the majoritarian outcome for all service
partnerships, for service partnerships in the particular field? Perhaps in
some fields, e.g., a partnership involved in debt collection where the
services partner is a lawyer--one would have different a priori assessments
of the likelihood of opportunistic behavior. The likelihood that the services
partner would engage in strategic misbehavior might be related to the
services partners being more likely to be lawyers--one's view of the
impact, positive or negative, could perhaps be subject to disagreement.
Would one use the majoritarian outcome for persons who trusted each other
31 Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 648-49.
32 Id. at 649.
33 Byron D. Sher & Alan R. Bromberg, Texas Partnership Law in the 20 h Century-
Why Texas ShouldAdopt the Uniform Partnership Act, 12 Sw. L. J. 263, 290 (1958).
34 Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 650, 662-65.
35 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcON. 305, 334 (1976).
36 Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 659.
37 See generally Royce de R. Barondes, The Limits of Quantitative Legal Analyses:
Chaos in Legal Scholarship and FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co., 48 RUTGERs L. REv. 161,
204 (1995) ("[T]here is no clear consensus concerning the level of generality to be used
with respect to both the parties and the transaction.").
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at the time the partnership was formed, if there is proof of that matter in a
particular case?
Although choosing the proper level of generality may be difficult in
many cases, it would seem appropriate to peg the level of generality on the
statutory language where there is a statute that actually has pertinent
language. The statutory provisions create the rules capital accounting
implements. It is more consistent with the role of a court where there is, in
fact, a pertinent statutory provision to try to apply the statutory provision.
That would call for framing the question in light of the structure the statute
provides. In this case, doing so calls for a relatively focused level of
generality-what the parties would have agreed-upon as the relative values
of their contributions.
II. How THE KOVAC1K RESULT CAN MAKE THE SERVICES PARTNER
MORE RISK-AVERSE
As noted above, Bainbridge makes the thoughtful observation that the
Kovacik result can create increased incentives for risk-taking by the
services partner in management of the partnership. On the other hand, it is
possible that it might make a services partner more risk-averse in making
decisions. Again, illustration of the principle requires reference to the
actual numbers.
This alternative incentive involves how a services partner would value
potential outcomes in circumstances not precisely like that the Kovacik
court faced. So, before turning to the capital accounting, we must see how
a court would treat a circumstance somewhat different from that at issue in
Kovacik.
Kovacik's capital contribution was capped at $10,000-the opinion
refers to "the $10,000 which [Kovacik] originally proposed and agreed to
invest. 38 To understand the services partner's full incentives, we need to
know what happens if the partnership loses, on a cash basis, more than
$10,000. The firm could, of course, lose more than was originally invested.
That Kovacik "provided all of the venture's financing through the credit of
Asbestos Siding Company"39 may identify-perhaps more clearly today
than in the 1950s--one circumstance in which a remodeling firm, like this
partnership, could end up with liabilities in excess of the cash needed
initially to perform remodeling services.
If the partnership lost more than the cash Kovacik agreed to provide as
capital, the court could allocate that additional loss in whole to Kovacik or
equally between the parties. Let us assume the court, had it been faced with
that question, would have allocated the additional loss equally between the
38 Kovacik, 315 P.2d at 316.
39 1d. at 315.
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parties.40 This view is not unreasonable. Allocating all losses to Kovacik
would effectively eliminate the significance of the expressly articulated
$10,000 cap on his contribution obligation.
Under this view, the services partner can have incentives to take less
risk than is desirable for the firm as a whole. Consider the following
example: Kovacik has contributed $10,000. The firm has operated at a loss
of $7,500 on a cash basis. The firm is considering either doing no more
business or undertaking a project with the following payoff structure:
* 50%-makes $7,000 on a cash basis, giving it a net cash loss
of $500 (-$7,500 + $7,000)
* 50%-loses $5,000 on a cash basis, giving it a net cash loss of
$12,500 (-$7,500 - $5,000)
The expected value of this project is $1,000. So, at least on a cash
basis, it is in the aggregate best interest of the firm to undertake the
project.4' However, as illustrated in Figure 6, it is a money-loser for Reed.
That is because if the firm loses an additional $5,000, the firm will have lost
a total of $12,500. Kovacik is responsible for the first $10,000, but the
remaining $2,500 loss is split evenly. That makes Reed liable for $1,250 in
that case, with Kovacik having lost $11,250. If the firm makes $7,000, the
firm will have made up almost all its prior loss, with a total loss of only
$500. So the results are:
Figure 6: Illustrating Increased Risk-Aversion Under Kovacik
Firm Kovacik Reed
Do Nothing -$7,500 -$7,500 $0
New Project
Success-50% likekihood -$500 -$500 $0
Failure-50% likekihood -$12,500 -$11,250 -$1,250
Expected Value -$6,500 -$5,875 -$625
The expected aggregate value of the firm's operations if it undertakes
the new project is -$6,500, $1,000 higher than the value before doing the
40 Sher and Bromberg reference the following theory, which they call the labor theory:
"Y [the services partner] then has the additional argument that his labor counterbalances
X's assets as a contribution to the partnership; Y suffers the loss of his labor just as
much as X suffers the loss of his assets; therefore neither should contribute to the
other's loss." Sher & Bromberg, supra note 33, at 289-90. This theory is comparable
to part of the rationale expressed in Kovacik. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
As Sher and Bromberg note, "This theory affords no guidance if the loss exceeds X's
asset contribution." Id. at 290.
41 We are now attributing no cost to Reed's services in this new project. That simply
makes the description of the circumstance easier; it's not required to illustrate the point.
2008]
14 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LA W [Vol. 3:1
JOURNAL
new project. It is in the aggregate best interest of the firm to undertake the
project. However, it is a money loser for Reed. In sum, under this
scenario, Reed is more risk-averse than the firm as a whole. This creates
incentives for Reed to use his influence as the services partner to avoid
having the partnership undertake this particular project, perhaps by
overestimating its risks to Kovacik or by some other method.
One of the basic differences between a partnership and a corporation is
that, absent an agreement to the contrary, each owner of a partnership has
the right to compel the termination of the business.4 2 Thus, the impact of
these incentives may be mitigated in a partnership relative to a
corporation,4 3 to the extent the partner providing cash is fully informed.
The point being made here is not that there will, in fact, generally be
less risk-taking. Rather, the point is that there are incentives to avoid risk
as well as incentives Bainbridge identifies to take additional risk. This
additional complexity makes it even more impracticable to try to ascertain
what the majoritarian hypothetical bargain would have been, further
supporting Bainbridge's conclusion that "[T]here does not appear to be a





III. MORE COMPLEX ILLUSTRATION-
OBLIGATION TO MEET CASH-FLOW REQUIREMENTS
This essay's initial analysis of Kovacik construed Kovacik's obligation
as requiring Kovacik contribute $10,000-to meet cash-flow obligations.
Kovacik's undertaking could have been of a different form. This Part
analyzes that circumstance.
Kovacik could have undertaken to make cash contributions to the
extent required to meet the partnership's cash-flow obligations, up to
$10,000. Treating the parties' contributions of equal value and as
contributions to the "property" of the partnership will not necessarily
produce the result the court reached.
To analyze this circumstance, one will have to know the cash-flow
requirements of the business. Let us assume, for the moment, that the
partnership had cash needs of $1,000 per month, and the endeavor was
finished in 10 months. Also assume no profit or loss is realized until the
very end of the business venture. The capital accounts at the end of the first
42 See U.P.A. §§ 31(1)(b) (dissolution caused by express will of any partner), 38(1) (on
dissolution, each partner "may have partnership property applied to discharge its
liabilities, and the surplus applied to pay in cash the net amount owing to the respective
partners").43 0f course, were a corporation operating in default under a credit agreement, its
creditors, if fully informed, would also have a right to immediate exit.
44 Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 659.
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month, treating services of equal value as the cash contributions, would
have been:




This discussion has skirted a somewhat thorny issue. The
requirements for capital from Kovacik and services from Reed need not be
simultaneous. Consider, for example, the case in which $1,000 in cash is
needed immediately upon formation of the business, and Reed provides
daily service for each day in the month. Would one say that, after the first
day, Reed's services had a value of Kovacik's contribution? If so, that
would mean that his services for the remainder of the month had no value.
We will, however, elide that granularity in the supposed agreement.
After the second month, the capital accounts would have been:




After the tenth month, the capital accounts would have been:




This is identical to the circumstance illustrated in Figures 3 and 4. If
the firm now liquidates, treating the parties as if they had agreed to treat
Reed's services as capital contributions of an equal value to Kovacik's cash
contributions, following the statutory provisions of the U.P.A. requires each
party gets back $660. The result is different, but still not the result the court
reached in Kovacik, if Kovacik contributed only $9,000. The capital
accounts are as follows at the end of the ninth month, before the loss is
realized:
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If it liquidates now, after nine months, the firn still has a loss, on a
cash basis, of $8,680. The cash initially contributed was $9,000. That
means the firm has assets remaining of $9,000 - $8,680, or $320. For our
capital accounting purposes, the loss is $18,000 - $320, or $17,680. Each
partner's share of the loss is half that, or $8,840. So, at the time the
partnership is to be wound-up, the capital accounts are:








share of loss ($8,840)
Total $160
Total $ 320
The result is still inconsistent with Kovacik. Reed is entitled to a cash
distribution-but in a smaller amount, $160. As one might surmise, if the
amount that Kovacik is required to contribute to fund the partnership-its
cash-flow requirements-is $8,680, the loss on a cash basis, Reed gets back
nothing.
This result arises because Kovacik's obligation is here being measured
based on the partnership's cash-flow requirements. A firn's cash-flow
needs are not necessarily the same as the amount of its loss on a cash basis.
IV. CONCLUSION
The opinion in Kovacik v. Reed, although purporting to rationalize its
outcome in two different ways, in fact-apparently without the knowledge
of the opinion's author-supports two different rules. The Kovacik court
purports to reach its conclusion by referencing essentially an implicit
agreement as to the relative values of their capital contributions. However,
the statutory provisions of the U.P.A. require a different implicit bargain as
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to the relative values of the parties' contributions in order to reach the result
the Kovacik court reaches. That implicit agreement is the following: The
value of the services provided by the services partner had an agreed value
of the amount the partnership would ultimately lose (on a cash basis).
Under this implicit bargain, the more the firm lost, the more valuable the
services were. A rationale for such a bargain is elusive.
Kovacik also illuminates an inherent difficulty with trying to formulate
a hypothetical bargain solution. The level of generality used to determine
the hypothetical bargain can substantially change the results.
The more obvious issue in assessing that level of generality is the
extent to which the parties' and the transaction's attributes are incorporated.
Kovacik illustrates a different dimension in selecting the level of generality
to assess the hypothetical bargain. If the matter is governed by statute,
there may be difficult questions concerning how to frame the hypothetical
bargain. It may be framed in terms of how the parties would have wanted
the outcome to be settled. Or, as in a case with facts similar to Kovacik, it
may be framed in terms of how the parties would have resolved the
question that the statutory provision treats as dispositive. This choice of
reference frame, as an analysis of Kovacik shows, may substantially
influence the outcome.
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